Barry Posen, "Putin's Preventive War: The 2022 Invasion of Ukraine" in International Security

Abstract
 

Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine in 2022 is consistent with the logic of preventive war. Simply put, one reason states often initiate wars is because they fear the consequences of a shifting balance of military power. In the logic of preventive war, the declining state worries that an existing competitor may initiate war later under more favorable circumstances, or that a rising state may use its newfound muscle to coerce the declining state. Notable preventive wars since World War II include when China intervened in Korea in 1950 to prevent the United States from unifying the Koreas and settling its own forces on the Chinese border; Israel’s attack on Egypt in 1956 to forestall its absorption of a huge new supply of tanks and fighter aircraft from the Eastern Bloc; and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 to forestall Iraq from possibly acquiring weapons of mass destruction. 

The tendency to consider preventive war is exacerbated if the declining state simultaneously sees itself as having a special, and fleeting, window of opportunity to prevent the shift. Putin likely believed that Russia faced such a moment. Ukraine’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would irretrievably shift the balance of power against Russia. During the Joe Biden administration, the United States and NATO intensified training, arming, and advising Ukraine, activities that likely convinced Putin that he did not have much time to forestall NATO membership through military action at reasonable cost. Offering this very logic, Avril Haines, the U.S. director of National Intelligence, explained that Putin attacked because “military action would be the best remaining option to prevent greater Ukrainian integration with the West, which he believed to be a significant threat to Russia’s national security. Furthermore, given the trend lines, it would only get more difficult to affect a military option over time.” Even Jens Stoltenberg, the secretary general of NATO, understood Russia’s preventive motive: “So he [Putin] went to war to prevent NATO, more NATO, close to his borders.”

Historians will debate whether it was Putin’s strategic calculus or his commitment to a nationalist or imperialist ideology (or some combination) that best explains the 2022 war. In the months since the war began, discussion of a strategic motivation has atrophied. This is unfortunate because if the Russians did have strategic motives, even in part, then understanding these motives could contribute to the diplomacy of an ultimate war settlement. Additionally, looking at the invasion through the lens of preventive war theory may provide some policy lessons for other dangerous conflicts of interest. 

This article takes the form of a “case explaining” case study. Theory is mobilized to better understand murky events. In contrast to most political science case studies, which treat the credibility of a theory as the matter at issue and the case as valid evidence that supports or undercuts the theory, here the theory is treated as valid, and the “facts” of the case are at least partly at issue. Put another way, there are many facts, but there is an uneven and incomplete supply of them, and analysts use the theory to make sense of those facts that do exist. I also use the theory as a coarsely ground lens to spy out some facts that may be hidden in the weeds. 

[For full article, MIT Press PDF Version]

From MIT Press